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REGULATING THE PRIVATIZATION OF 
WAR: HOW TO STOP PRIVATE MILITARY 
FIRMS FROM COMMITTING HUMAN 
RIGHTS ABUSES 
Nathaniel Stinnett*
Abstract: Private Military Firms (PMFs) have recently stepped in to ªll 
the growing global demand for temporary, highly-specialized military 
services. These private corporations can be a blessing to their client 
countries in that they offer many economic, military, and political 
beneªts not ordinarily found in standing armies. However, PMFs fall 
within a gap in international law, which presumes and prefers a 
monopolization of force by state actors, thereby leaving no effective way 
to deal with those PMFs that commit human rights abuses. This Note 
traces the history of private militaries and the applicable legal standards 
and argues for a coordinated domestic approach among a handful of 
countries to legitimize and regulate PMFs. 
Introduction 
 Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an abundance of 
unemployed, highly-trained soldiers in the Developed World.1 Recently, 
the market has seen an increasing demand for such soldiers to support 
Developing World regimes that had hitherto relied upon their Cold 
War sponsors for military support.2 A similar demand also exists among 
Developed World armies, who now look to outsource many of their 
training and support needs.3 Private Military Firms (PMFs), which are 
“proªt driven organizations that trade in professional services intri-
cately linked to warfare,” have stepped in to ªll these demands in the 
global security market.4 Offering services that range from operational 
                                                                                                                      
* Nathaniel Stinnett is the Editor-in-Chief of the Boston College International & Compara-
tive Law Review. 
1 See Juan Carlos Zarate, The Emergence of a New Dog of War: Private International Security 
Companies, International Law, and the New World Disorder, 34 Stan. J. Int’l L. 75, 75–76 
(1998). 
2 Id. 
3 P.W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and Its 
Ramiªcations for International Security, 26 Int’l Sec. 186, 188–89 (2001/02). 
4 See id. at 186. 
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support and military training to strategic planning and even full-scale 
combat, PMFs bring their military expertise to places where Developed 
World armies are often loath to intervene.5
 Despite their widespread use, PMFs fall within a gap in interna-
tional law, which presumes and prefers a monopolization of force by 
state actors.6 Indeed, although PMFs often perform the same tasks as 
state-sponsored militaries, the PMF corporate structure is a foreign 
concept to international law.7 Therefore, there is very little legal pro-
tection for the victims of PMF human rights abuses.8
 This Note focuses on how best to remedy PMF human rights 
abuses. First, it traces the long history of private, proªt-driven militar-
ies. In doing so, it discusses the reasons for the 20th Century’s histori-
cally aberrant, yet profound, distaste for private armies.9 Second, it 
discusses the inadequacies of existing international law when applied 
to PMFs as well as why the proposed remedies for these inadequacies 
are unworkable. Finally, this Note outlines a practical and effective 
method of legitimizing and regulating PMFs so as to retain their util-
ity while minimizing their potential for criminal behavior. 
I. History and Background 
A. A History of Private Militaries 
 “As long as humanity has waged war, there have been mercenar-
ies.”10 Indeed, the history of private militaries can be traced back at 
least 3,000 years, when Numidian mercenaries played a large role in 
Ramses II’s attack on Kadesh (1294 B.C.), and biblical King David’s 
mercenaries drove the Philistines from Israel (1000 B.C.).11 The an-
cient Greeks and Romans also relied heavily upon mercenaries, as did 
Emperor Justinian and William the Conqueror.12
                                                                                                                      
5 See Herbert M. Howe, The Privatization of International Affairs: Global Order and the Pri-
vatization of Security, 22 Fletcher F. World Aff. 1, 5 (1998). 
6 See id. at 1; Tina Garmon, Comment, Domesticating International Corporate Responsibility: 
Holding Private Military Firms Accountable Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 11 Tul. J. Int’l & 
Comp. L. 325, 338–39 (2003). 
7 See Garmon, supra note 6, at 338–39. 
8 See id. 
9 See Todd S. Milliard, Overcoming Post-Colonial Myopia: A Call to Recognize and Regulate 
Private Military Companies, 176 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 6–11 (2003). 
10 Zarate, supra note 1, at 82. 
11 Milliard, supra note 9, at 2. 
12 Id. 
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 The use of mercenaries continued unabated up through the mod-
ern era. In the Middle Ages, companies of ªghting men offered their 
collective skills to whomever would hire them.13 During the Renais-
sance, Italy’s city-states contracted with freelance military commanders, 
or condottieri, so as to deny military power to potential domestic rivals 
and to avoid disrupting “the productive economy by forcing normal 
citizens into military service.”14 Most of the forces used in the Thirty 
Years’ War (1618–1648) were privately contracted,15 and the British 
Crown famously hired Hessian soldiers to ªght against George Wash-
ington’s troops in the American Revolutionary War.16 Indeed, “not un-
til the Franco-German War of 1870 did the ‘nation-in-arms’ concept 
gain predominance in the world’s militaries,” after which armies built 
upon national loyalties quickly became the international norm.17
 Throughout the twentieth century, the international community 
further curtailed organized private armies.18 In particular, there was 
an extraordinary backlash against the individual, ad-hoc mercenaries, 
commonly known as les affreux (“the dreaded ones”), who threatened 
the stability of many mineral-rich, post-Colonial African regimes.19 
Indeed, during the 1960s and 70s, the governments of Zaire, Nigeria, 
Sudan, Guinea, Angola, Benin, the Comoro Islands, and the Sey-
chelles were all seriously threatened by such mercenaries who usually 
hailed from these countries’ previous colonial occupiers.20 It is largely 
because of the abuses committed by these mercenaries and the sig-
niªcant threat they posed to post-Colonial independence that an in-
ternational consensus developed condemning mercenarism.21
B. The Emergence of Private Military Firms 
 For many reasons, today’s PMFs are quite different from les affreux 
of a few decades ago or even today’s individual soldiers of fortune.22 As 
P.W. Singer of the Brookings Institution has characterized them, 
                                                                                                                      
13 See Zarate, supra note 1, at 83. 
14 Id. at 84. 
15 Singer, supra note 3, at 190. 
16 Zarate, supra note 1, at 85. 
17 Milliard, supra note 9, at 6–7. 
18 See Singer, supra note 3, at 191. 
19 See Zarate, supra note 1, at 87. 
20 See id. at 88–89. 
21 Id. at 116. 
22 See Singer, supra note 3, at 191. 
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Today’s PMFs represent the evolution of private actors in 
warfare. The critical analytic factor is their modern corpo-
rate business form. PMFs are hierarchically organized into 
incorporated and registered businesses that trade and com-
pete openly in the international market, link to outside 
ªnancial holdings, recruit more proªciently than their 
predecessors, and provide a wider range of military services 
to a greater variety and number of clients. Corporatization 
not only distinguishes PMFs from mercenaries and other 
past private military ventures, but it also offers certain advan-
tages in both efªciency and effectiveness.23
 Perhaps the greatest reason for the post-Cold War emergence of 
PMFs is the growing demand for private military expertise within the 
Developed World.24 Not only did the world’s armies shrink by more 
than 6 million people during the 1990s,25 but many Developed World 
governments also announced policies of non-intervention except in 
areas of vital national interest.26 Subsequently, PMFs have replaced 
many uniformed soldiers because they “can perform services which 
governments approve of, but hesitate to attempt themselves because 
of political, military or ªnancial costs.”27 Indeed, PMFs have per-
formed specialized tasks in every major post-Cold War American mili-
tary operation; they have served as American proxies in places like 
Colombia and Liberia, and they even operate the computer and 
communications systems for the U.S. nuclear response at NORAD’s 
Cheyenne Mountain base.28
 Developing countries also hire PMFs to ªght the small-scale con-
ºicts that do not attract the attention of militarily developed na-
tions.29 Due to recent advances in weapons technology, “[a]lmost any 
group operating inside a weak state can now acquire at least limited 
military capabilities, thus lowering the bar for creating viable threats 
                                                                                                                      
23 Id. 
24 See Howe, supra note 5, at 5–7. 
25 Singer, supra note 3, at 193. 
26 Howe, supra note 5, at 5 (referencing President Clinton’s Presidential Decision Di-
rective 25 as an example of a trend towards policies of non-intervention). 
27 Id. 
28 Singer, supra note 3, at 188–89; see also US’s ‘Private Army’ Grows, Christian Science 
Monitor, Sept. 3, 2003, at 6. 
29 Zarate, supra note 1, at 92. 
2005] Privitization of the Military and Human Rights Abuses 215 
to the status quo.”30 Since Developing World armies rarely have the 
ability to combat such threats, they hire PMFs to come to the rescue.31
C. When PMFs Run Amok 
 Although it is clear that PMFs ªll an important role in the global 
security market, it is also clear that PMFs do not always respect the 
international standards of armed conºict.32 For instance, in 1995, the 
government of Sierra Leone hired the South African PMF, Executive 
Outcomes (EO), to help subdue the rebellious Revolutionary United 
Front.33 EO quickly assumed control over all offensive operations and, 
when asked how to distinguish between civilians and rebels, EO 
commanders supposedly ordered their pilots to just “kill everybody.”34
 Another such example involves DynCorp, an American PMF cur-
rently active in Iraq.35 While working in the Balkans, several DynCorp 
employees allegedly ran a prostitution ring, selling the services of girls 
as young as twelve years old.36 Despite these wide-spread accusations, 
none of the accused DynCorp employees were brought to trial or dis-
ciplined in any way. 37 Rather, DynCorp has addressed the issue by ªr-
ing the whistle-blower who exposed the prostitution ring.38
II. Discussion 
A. Mercenary Restrictions do not Apply to PMFs 
 One way in which the international community has tried to restrict 
private militaries is by condemning mercenary activity.39 However, dif-
ferent states deªne “mercenary” in different ways, usually according to 
that state’s history as a client or victim of mercenaries.40 Largely be-
cause of these differences, it is unclear whether international law has 
                                                                                                                      
30 Singer, supra note 3, at 196. 
31 See Zarate, supra note 1, at 92. 
32 See id. at 76; Jennifer L. Heil, Comment, African Private Security Companies and the 
Alien Tort Claims Act: Could Multinational Oil and Mining Companies Be Liable?, 22 Nw. J. 
Int’l L. & Bus. 291, 297–98 (2002). 
33 See Heil, supra note 32, at 297. 
34 Garmon, supra note 6, at 326. 
35 The Enron Pentagon, Boston Globe, Oct. 19, 2003, at L12. 
36 Colombia: Private Companies on the Frontline, Financial Times, Aug. 12, 2003, at 15. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 See Zarate, supra note 1, at 125–34. 
40 See id. at 120. 
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settled upon a particular deªnition of “mercenary,” but scholars largely 
agree that none of the current deªnitions include PMFs.41
 The two deªnitive documents restricting mercenary activity are 
the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949 (Protocol I)42 and the International Convention against the Re-
cruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries (UN Merce-
nary Convention).43
 Protocol I’s regulatory power is largely derived from its discour-
agement of mercenary activity by withdrawing eligibility for prisoner 
of war status.44 However, Protocol I’s deªnition of “mercenary” ex-
cludes military trainers, advisors, and support staff, thereby omitting 
the great majority of PMF activities.45 Furthermore, even those PMFs 
engaging in direct combat would likely escape Protocol I’s regulations 
in any one of three ways. First, if PMFs engage in combat while on a 
security detail, they would probably avoid the Protocol I requirement 
of  involvement in “armed conºict.”46 Second, it is almost impossible 
to prove that a PMF employee’s motivation is ªnancial gain, which is a 
requisite component of Protocol I’s deªnition of “mercenary.”47 
Third, PMFs often fully integrate into a client’s armed forces, thereby 
avoiding mercenary classiªcation under Protocol I.48
 Largely due to perceived inadequacies in Protocol I’s restrictions 
on mercenarism, the UN Mercenary Convention extended the Protocol 
I deªnition to cover all conºicts (beyond just international armed con-
ºicts) and also added a second, more sweeping deªnition of mercenary 
activities.49 However, this second deªnition still does not apply to most 
                                                                                                                      
41 See id. at 120–33. 
42 See Zarate, supra note 1, 123-25; see also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conven-
tions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conºicts, June 8, 1977, art. 47, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I]. Article 47 deªnes 
a mercenary as any person who (1) ªghts abroad, (2) in combat, (3) is motivated by pri-
vate gain paid substantially more than standing army combatants, (4) is neither a national 
nor resident of either Party, (5) is not a member of either Party’s armed forces, and (6) is 
not on ofªcial duty as a member of a non-Party State’s armed forces. See Protocol I, art. 47. 
43 U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 43, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/34 (1989) (entered 
into force Oct. 20, 2001) [hereinafter UN Mercenary Convention]. Article 1(2) of the UN 
Mercenary Convention includes the Protocol I deªnition, but adds that a mercenary is any 
person who (1) ªghts in all conºicts, (2) aimed at overthrowing or undermining a gov-
ernment or its State’s territorial integrity. Id. art. 1(2). 
44 See Milliard, supra note 9, at 41. 
45 See Zarate, supra note 1, at 123. 
46 Id. at 124; see also Protocol I, supra note 42, art. 2(a). 
47 See Milliard, supra note 9, at 59–61; Protocol I, supra note 42, art. 2(c). 
48 See Zarate, supra note 1, at 124; Protocol I, supra note 42, art. 2(e). 
49 See Milliard, supra note 9, at 57–58. 
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PMFs since it retains both the loophole for those combatants who inte-
grate into a client’s armed forces and the problems associated with as-
certaining a combatant’s motivation for ªghting.50 Indeed, it is widely 
recognized that neither the Protocol I nor the UN Mercenary Conven-
tion’s deªnitions of “mercenary” cover a majority of PMF activity.51
B. The Alien Tort Claims Act 
 Introduced in 1789, but rarely invoked over the next two centu-
ries, the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) gives aliens access to U.S. fed-
eral courts for violations of international law.52 The ATCA was passed 
to ensure that visiting diplomats could bring claims against the United 
States or U.S. citizens and have those claims heard in federal, rather 
than state, courts.53 More recently, however, U.S. courts have ex-
panded the ATCA to cover claims for international human rights 
abuses occurring outside the United States.54
 The 1980 case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala ushered in this more ex-
pansive interpretation of the ATCA.55 In Filartiga, the 2nd Circuit re-
tained jurisdiction over an action where a Paraguayan citizen sued a 
former Paraguayan police ofªcer for acts of torture committed in 
Paraguay.56 In doing so, the court read the ATCA both as an action-
granting and a forum-granting statute, allowing U.S. district courts to 
hear any case in which an alien alleges a tort committed in violation 
of customary or treaty-based international law.57
 More recently, this trend has continued as U.S. district courts have 
expanded ATCA liability to cover individual war criminals in the For-
mer Republic of Yugoslavia and political parties in Zimbabwe.58 Fur-
thermore, in Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Company, a district court found the 
Ford Motor Company liable for its use of slave labor during World War 
                                                                                                                      
50 Id. at 59–62. See generally UN Mercenary Convention, supra note 43 (further con-
stricting the integration of forces loophole by recognizing only those combatants who 
integrate with the armed forces of a state actor). 
51 See Zarate, supra note 1, at 123–25. 
52 Garmon, supra note 6, at 339; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) (stating “district courts 
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”). 
53 Heil, supra note 32, at 298. 
54 Id. 
55 See Garmon, supra note 6, at 339–40; see also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d 
Cir. 1980). 
56 See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878, 885. 
57 Garmon, supra note 6, at 339–40; see also Filartiga, 630 2d at 884–87. 
58 See generally Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); see also Kadic v. 
Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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II, thereby holding that even corporations that work closely with state 
actors will be held liable under the ATCA for violations of international 
law.59 This trend, from Filartiga to Iwanowa, has led some scholars to 
believe that PMFs can successfully be held liable under the ATCA.60
C. Domestic and International Regulatory Systems 
 Although some countries restrict mercenary activity and many 
countries forbid their citizens to enlist in foreign armies, very few 
countries have laws regulating PMFs.61 Legislation within PMF host 
countries usually takes one of three forms: (1) a complete ban upon 
any military activity other than in support of that country’s armed 
forces; (2) regulation or complete prohibition of mercenary activity, 
but no mention of PMF activity; or (3) explicit regulation of PMF ac-
tivity.62 Of the eleven currently known PMF host countries, only the 
United States and South Africa explicitly regulate PMF activity.63
 The U.S. Arms Export Control Act (AECA) regulates the export 
of both arms and military services.64 Under the International Transfer 
of Arms Regulations (ITAR is the regulatory scheme which imple-
ments the AECA), all PMFs providing strategic, training, or mainte-
nance advice to foreign forces must register with, and obtain a license 
from, the State Department.65 Additionally, the State Department 
must individually approve (after Congressional notiªcation) each 
speciªc PMF contract in excess of $50 million.66
 Largely in response to the alleged atrocities of Executive Out-
comes in Sierra Leone, South Africa passed the Regulation of Foreign 
                                                                                                                      
59 See Garmon, supra note 6, at 342–43; Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 
439 (D.N.J. 1999). 
60 See Garmon, supra note 6, at 342–43. Garmon further asserts that the 9th Circuit, in 
Doe I v. Unocal, has held corporations liable for aiding and abetting violations of interna-
tional law. Therefore, even PMFs that only train and support forces that commit human 
right abuses might still be liable under the ATCA. See id. at 346–49. 
61See United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Ofªce, Private Military 
Companies: Options for Regulation 39–43, Annex B (2002). 
62 Id. 
63 Id.; see also Listing of Private Military Firms and Country of Origin on the Public Integ-
rity Website, at http://www.publicintegrity.org/bow/docs/bow_companies.xls (last visited 
Dec. 7, 2004) [hereinafter ICIJ] The United States, United Kingdom, Canada, France, Israel, 
South Africa, Russia, Angola, Sierra Leone, Belgium, and Uganda currently host active PMFs. 
A handful of other countries may host PMFs, but it is undetermined whether the companies 
actually exist. Id. 
64 22 U.S.C. § 2752 (as amended 1999) [hereinafter AECA]. 
65 See United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Ofªce, supra note 61, at 39–
40. 
66 Id. at 39. 
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Military Assistance Act (FMAA) in September of 1998.67 Much like the 
American regulatory scheme, the FMAA establishes a licensing pro-
cedure for PMFs who wish to offer non-combat military services to 
foreigners.68 South Africa also explicitly bases its licensing decisions 
on principles of international law (including human rights law) and 
prohibits PMFs from acting as combatants in armed conºict.69
 Other suggested regulatory schemes consist of everything from a 
laissez-faire approach to an international regulatory system and even 
an outright ban on PMF activity.70 Laissez-faire proponents argue that 
market forces will drive PMFs to honor contracts, maintain a good 
reputation, and eschew human rights abuses.71 Those arguing for in-
ternational regulation call for the United Nations to regulate PMFs 
through a scheme similar to the American and South African mod-
els.72 Lastly, those who wish to completely ban PMFs fear that any le-
gitimization of PMF activity erodes sovereignty by destroying the mo-
nopoly of force by state actors and encouraging neo-colonialist 
incursions into Developing World conºicts.73
III. Analysis 
A. Banning PMF Activity is both Unwise and Unlikely 
 Since current international norms against mercenaries are con-
sidered either unenforceable or inapplicable to PMFs, some states 
and scholars have suggested either banning all PMF activity or broad-
ening the Protocol I and UN Mercenary Convention deªnitions to 
cover PMF activity.74 Adherents to the latter approach aim to discour-
age PMF activity (as is done to mercenary activity) by explicitly with-
drawing prisoner of war rights from their employees.75 However, such 
                                                                                                                      
67 Id. 
68 See Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998, § 5 (S. Afr.), available at 
http://polity.org.za/html/govdocs/legislation/1998/act15.pdf [hereinafter FMAA]. 
69 See United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Ofªce, supra note 61, at 40. 
70 See Zarate, supra note 1, at 145–49 (discussing an outright ban of PMFs as well as the 
laissez-faire approach); see also Milliard, supra note 9, at 79–84 (promoting an international 
regulatory scheme). 
71 See Zarate, supra note 1, at 148–49. 
72 See Milliard, supra note 9, at 79–84. 
73 See Zarate, supra note 1, at 145–46. 
74 Id. 
75 See id. (referencing the U.N. Special Rapporteur’s 1997 suggestions to expand the 
“mercenary” deªnition to include PMFs). The Protocol I deªnition of “combatant” proba-
bly includes PMFs, thereby granting them prisoner of war rights. See Protocol I, supra note 
42, art. 43. 
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a sweeping condemnation of PMFs is unlikely to occur due to the 
wide-spread recognition of their utility.76
 Indeed, the almost universal (though often tacit) approval of PMFs 
is well-founded due to their economic, military, and political advan-
tages.77 It is very expensive for governments to maintain standing ar-
mies because they demand housing, salary, and pensions.78 Moreover, 
standing armies contain specialists who remain on the pay-roll even 
when their specialty is not required.79 In contrast, PMFs are highly spe-
cialized and are paid only to perform speciªc tasks and then go 
home.80 For instance, rather than depend upon an expensive, standing 
army of security-conscious mail delivery soldiers, the U.S. military has 
hired Kellogg Brown & Root to provide postal services in Iraq.81
 PMFs also offer military advantages in that they consist of highly-
trained military specialists (often from prestigious special-forces units 
of militarily advanced countries) who can assemble extraordinarily 
quickly.82 For instance, EO has a permanent staff of 30, but can “de-
ploy a fully supported battalion of about 650 men within 15 days.”83 
Since EO’s recent successes have earned it the distinction of the “most 
deadly and efªcient force operating in sub-Saharan Africa today 
[aside from the South African army],” it certainly can offer signiªcant 
military advantages over the standing armies of many client nations.84
 Finally, the political beneªts of hiring PMFs are manifold. First and 
foremost, although the loss of a PMF employee is certainly a personal 
tragedy, the loss of a uniformed soldier almost always becomes a na-
tional tragedy, bringing signiªcant political pressure to bear upon any 
government.85 Second, the governments of many conºict-ridden coun-
tries do not want to so empower their national armies as to risk a coup 
d’etat.86 Thus, PMFs offer a way to exercise force without strengthening 
potential domestic enemies.87 Lastly, economic concerns quickly be-
come political concerns and money saved by not supporting a standing 
                                                                                                                      
76 See Howe, supra note 5, at 2–3. 
77 Id. at 5–7. 
78 Id. at 5. 
79 Id. 
80 See id. 
81 See Doug Brooks, A New Twist on a Long Military Tradition, Boston Globe, Oct. 19, 
2003, at L12. 
82 See Howe, supra note 5, at 2, 5; Singer, supra note 3, at 193–94. 
83 See Howe, supra note 5, at 5. 
84 See Zarate, supra note 1, at 93. 
85 See Singer, supra note 3, at 218. 
86 See Howe, supra note 5, at 6. 
87 See id. 
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army can often be spent on the very ills that created a client country’s 
instability in the ªrst place.88 Indeed, PMFs offer so many economic, 
military, and political advantages to client states that banning or dis-
couraging PMF activity would be unpopular, impractical, and univer-
sally harmful.89
B. The ATCA Is an Inadequate Remedy for PMF Abuses 
 Even if a plaintiff shows both that a PMF has violated interna-
tional law and that corporations are subject to the ATCA, she still 
must overcome a host of procedural hurdles.90 ATCA defendants of-
ten successfully use forum non conveniens, exhaustion of remedies, 
comity, standing, and failure to join an indispensable party to stymie 
litigation.91 The ATCA also has a ten year statute of limitations, which 
would further limit claims only to those PMF abuses that are reported 
relatively quickly.92 Finally, personal jurisdiction in the United States 
over non-American PMFs (over two-thirds of the currently active to-
tal) could be established only if those defendants conducted “con-
tinuous and systematic business” within the United States.93 In short, 
the ATCA may be a useful weapon against a handful of rogue PMFs, 
but the law’s many procedural loopholes and wide inapplicability to 
most PMFs makes it a poor regulatory tool.94
C. The Case for Coordinated Domestic Regulation of PMFs 
 The American and South African approaches to regulating PMFs 
are worthy of emulation, and a coordinated effort to establish similar 
regulatory schemes in the other nine PMF host countries would offer 
the best remedy for potential PMF abuses.95 Both the American AECA 
and the South African FMAA insist upon state licensing of all PMFs.96 
These licensing systems promote PMF responsibility because the free 
market favors licensed respectability, and very few PMFs will risk crimi-
                                                                                                                      
88 See id. at 5–6. 
89 See generally Howe, supra note 5. 
90 Heil, supra note 32, at 303. 
91 Id. 
92 See Garmon, supra note 6, at 343. 
93 See Heil, supra note 32, at 306; see also ICIJ, supra note 63. 
94 See Heil, supra note 32, at 303–06. 
95 See AECA, supra note 63; FMAA, supra note 68. 
96 See AECA, supra note 63; see also FMAA, supra note 68. 
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nal liability by evading their host country’s oversight.97 Any domestic 
regulation should also include the AECA’s notiªcation requirements 
for most PMF contracts, since such notiªcation precludes host govern-
ments from claiming ignorance of their PMFs’ actions.98 This, in turn, 
strengthens government oversight of PMFs and lessens the likelihood 
of their behaving in ways that would embarrass their host country.99 
Finally, much like the FMAA’s licensing standards, domestic regulation 
should criminalize all PMF activity in violation of international law, 
thereby creating something akin to a criminal version of the ATCA in 
all PMF host countries.100
 Such a coordinated regulatory scheme would also overcome the 
failures of a laissez-faire approach.101 The mere fact that PMF abuses 
have occurred proves that market forces do not create sufªcient incen-
tives for good behavior.102 Indeed, since war is inherently dirty and 
PMFs are hired to win wars, it can be argued that there is actually a 
strong market incentive for PMFs to strive to win at any cost.103 On the 
other hand, regulation would redeªne market incentives by conferring 
respect upon licensed PMFs, while leaving others in a shadow of ille-
gitimacy and open to criminal prosecution for unlicensed operation.104
 Finally, due to the relatively small number of PMF host countries, 
coordinated domestic regulation offers an easier (and equally effec-
tive) alternative to an international regulatory scheme.105 Of the sixty-
one currently active PMFs, twenty-four come from the United States 
and South Africa, while another twenty are based in the United King-
dom (which is currently considering enacting PMF regulations).106 
Most of the remaining sixteen hail from Canada, France, Israel, and 
Angola, thereby making a fully international regulatory regime en-
tirely superºuous.107 Furthermore, the likelihood of PMFs sprouting 
up in un-regulated countries is small since the supply of military ex-
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pertise (and the demand for it) is largely concentrated in the eleven 
current PMF host countries.108
Conclusion 
 In both the Developed and Developing Worlds, there is a growing 
need for inexpensive, specialized military expertise, and PMFs ªll that 
need far better than standing armies. However, since current interna-
tional and domestic laws do not adequately restrain PMFs from com-
mitting human rights abuses, the privatized military industry must be 
regulated in such a way that international norms are respected and 
protected. A coordinated domestic regulatory scheme (along the 
lines of those currently found within the United States and South Af-
rica) would adequately solve this problem and would require the as-
sent of only the eleven current PMF host countries, thereby offering 
the easiest and most effective remedy to PMF human rights abuses. 
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